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Over the past several decades the number of countries with antidumping laws 
has increased substantially. As countries continue to adopt antidumping laws, it is vital 
to understand the ways that antidumping usage evolves in new user countries. This 
paper examines the evolution of antidumping filings over the first ten years after 
antidumping laws are adopted. Our statistical analysis of data on countries that adopted 
antidumping laws after 1979 indicates that the number of filings and the percentage of 
cases that receive an affirmative decision increase over the first ten years after a country 
adopts AD laws. We also see an increase in the percentage of cases initiated by metal 
industries over these years. 
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Background 
 Dumping occurs in international trade when a firm charges an export price that 
is significantly lower than the price that they charge in their own market. Sometimes 
dumping may be related to “predatory pricing,” in which a foreign company 
deliberately sells goods at a low price in order to drive out domestic competition. Even 
if the harm is not deliberate, a firm may file an antidumping (AD) duty to protect their 
domestic industry from damage by foreign competition.  
 The current rules for AD implementation were codified in the Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The “Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994” 
includes details on how to determine whether dumping has occurred, how to calculate 
injury to the domestic industry, and other definitional and procedural guidelines.1 The 
key criteria in the determination of dumping under the Uruguay Round are called “fair 
value” (or “normal value”) and “material injury.”  
 If the exporting firm is found to be charging a price that is below “fair value,” 
they may be subjected to a penalty. “Fair value” is meant to indicate the “ex factory” 
price of the good in the exporter’s market. By “ex factory” we mean the price of the 
good as it leaves the factory, i.e. before the addition of transportation costs and other 
things that might increase the final price to the consumer. If the exporting country does 
not sell the product in their own market, then the price of the good in a third country 
may be used. Another way to calculate fair value is through “constructed cost.” In this 
method the agency attempts to calculate the cost of producing one unit of the good, plus 
                                                        
1 Available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_05_e.htm 
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some overhead costs and profits. This information is requested from the firm that is 
accused of dumping, and providing this information can be costly and difficult. If the 
exporting firm refuses to provide this information, then the agency can use “facts 
available” to estimate the fair value, which is often information provide by the 
petitioning firm. 
 The second criterion is evidence of whether the dumping activity has caused (or 
threatens to cause) material injury to the domestic industry. Various indicators of 
domestic performance may be used to determine material injury, such as productivity 
and employment. The agency is also supposed to establish a causal relationship, but this 
can be very difficult to prove. If the “fair value” and “material injury” criteria are met, 
then an antidumping duty can be implemented. 
 When a firm is found guilty of dumping, there are a number of penalties that can 
be levied. Ad valorem duties are calculated based on a percentage of the price of the 
good. Specific duties represent a fixed value charged for a certain amount of the good 
sold. A price undertaking occurs when a price floor is established. Sometimes the 
exporting firm may choose to cease exporting the good entirely due to these duties. 
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Introduction 
Over the last several decades there has been a proliferation of countries using 
AD laws.  Developing countries have moved from having only a negligible share in AD 
filings to becoming responsible for over half of all initiations.2 Furthermore, AD laws 
have become the defacto tool for trade protectionism. Even the expansive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Free Trade Agreement explicitly refuses to alter the existing AD 
framework.3 With the rapid increase in new AD users, and the enshrinement of AD 
laws as the dominant form of legal protectionism, it is vital that we understand the 
motivations among new AD users for implementing AD laws, and the manner in which 
these laws are utilized by domestic firms and industries. 
 There is a rich literature on the use of AD duties by “traditional” heavy users 
such as Canada, the United States, and the European Union. Much of this literature has 
focused on understanding macroeconomic factors that determine the volume and size of 
AD duties.4 Many key papers in the field have also identified the effect of AD on 
overall trade flows.5 Another important area of study has been the possibility of 
retaliation or collusion in response to AD duties.6 The proliferation of new AD users 
over the past several decades has opened up new opportunities for research. Various 
papers have looked at the differences in macroeconomic determinants of AD filings 
                                                        
2 Thomas J. Prusa, "On the spread and impact of anti‐ dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue 
canadienne d'économique 34, no. 3 (2001): 591. 
3 Trans Pacific Partnership, chapter 6, article 6.8, available at https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-
partnership/trade-remedies-edc8bd7d4a7e#.dil5bx2mv 
4 Michael M. Knetter, and Thomas J. Prusa, "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence 
from four countries," Journal of International Economics 61, no. 1 (2003): 1-17. 
5 Tibor Besedeš and Thomas J. Prusa, Antidumping and the Death of Trade, No. w19555. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2013. 
6 Bruce A. Blonigen and Chad P. Bown, "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International 
Economics 60, no. 2 (2003): 249-273.  
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between developing and developed countries,7 and the consequences of AD law 
adoption for new users.8  
 This project merges previous research on AD characteristics and new AD users 
with an analysis of the evolution of AD duties over time. The evolution of AD usage 
can be examined from both a government and a firm perspective. Blonigen (2006a) 
outlines the evolution of discretionary practices in the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
calculation of dumping margins, and finds that the Department of Commerce altered its 
method of calculating dumping margins over time to increase the penalty in favor of the 
domestic industry.9  In another study, Blonigen (2006b) examines firm learning in the 
AD process, and finds evidence that firms with AD experience were more effective at 
arguing for their case. He also finds that firms with experience were more willing to file 
weaker AD cases because of the subsequent reduction in filing costs.10  
This thesis will examine the evolution of dumping behavior based on the 
changes in the volume and size of dumping margins during the first ten years after a 
country adopts AD laws.  A major limitation of previous research on new AD users is 
that comprehensive data has not been historically available. High quality cross-country 
data has recently been made available on Chad Bown’s Global Antidumping Database. 
My thesis will utilize this data by extending Blonigen’s analysis of the evolution of AD 
practices over time with the increased interest in new AD users (primarily in developing 
countries). In particular, I will test the null hypothesis that the volume and size of AD                                                         
7 Aradhna Aggarwal, "Macro economic determinants of antidumping: A comparative analysis of 
developed and developing countries," World Development 32, no. 6 (2004): 1043-1057. 
8 Prusa,  “impact of antidumping,” 2001. 
9 Bruce A. Blonigen, "Evolving discretionary practices of US antidumping activity," Canadian Journal of 
Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique39, no. 3 (2006): 874-900. 
10 Bruce A. Blonigen, "Working the system: Firm learning and the antidumping process," European 
Journal of Political Economy 22, no. 3 (2006): 715-731. 
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margins do not increase over the course of the first ten years after a country adopts AD 
laws. I will also examine how the share of AD filings by a few key industries changes 
over these years. One alternative hypothesis is that there will be an increase in the 
volume and size of AD margins as domestic industries seek an advantage over foreign 
competition, and as firms and agencies learn how to more effectively use AD laws. 
Another hypothesis might be that the volume and size do not change significantly due to 
the threat of retaliation or the presence of collusion between domestic and foreign firms. 
 My thesis is organized as follows. First, I will describe my data sources, and 
examine the advantages and drawbacks that they provide. Second, I will present my 
methodology, and describe the various models that I am estimating. Third, I will 
examine the results of these regressions, and discuss the implications for my 
hypotheses. Finally I will comment on the potential for further research, as well as the 
broader policy implications of my thesis. 
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Data 
 Data on AD filings come from Chad Bown’s Global Antidumping Database 
(GAD).11 Originally established in 2005, the database is hosted by the World Bank, and 
is the first comprehensive database of information on AD filings compiled from primary 
source national government documents. The GAD has full data on 31 countries (where 
the European Union is counted as one country). There are 18 other countries for which 
minimal data exists. The full information includes the country initiating the filing, the 
country under investigation, the product being dumped with its harmonized system 
product code, the final dumping measure imposed, and the low and high end of the 
range for the dumping margin reported by the WTO. It also includes the date of 
initiation, and the date for all of the preliminary and final proceedings, as well as the 
revocation date if applicable. 
 To examine the changes in AD filings after AD laws were first adopted in a 
country, I needed the dates that each country adopted AD laws. This data was retrieved 
from a forthcoming book chapter by Blonigen and Prusa (forthcoming).12 While 
countries began adopting these laws in the early 1900s, the earliest cases listed in the 
GAD were from 1978. Thus I was only able to use countries that adopted laws after 
1980. The countries that adopted AD laws after this date, and for which data was 
available, as well as the number of cases documented in each country are listed in the 
appendix. 
                                                        
11 Chad P. Bown, "Global Antidumping Database,” The World Bank, June (2015),  
http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/  
12 Bruce A. Blonigen and Thomas J. Prusa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” in Handbook of 
Commercial Policy, ed. Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger. (North Holland, forthcoming).  
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 Data for real effective exchange rates based on annual consumer price index 
came from a dataset hosted by Bruegal.13 The real effective exchange rate data used in 
this thesis are based on 67 trading partners because this was the best data available 
going back to 1980. 
 The GDP data I used came from the World Bank’s “World Databank.”14 This 
data calculates GDP at market prices in current U.S. dollars. For political reasons, the 
World Bank does not include GDP from Taiwan. This data was pulled from the 
“National Statistics” database compiled by the Taiwanese government.15 
 There is an additional caveat about the data that must be addressed. In 1993, 
seven years after adopting AD laws, Mexico entered into a massive trade war with 
China. During this year, Mexico filed over a thousand AD cases against China, many 
with margins upwards of 1000%. This event would account for over 30% of the total 
observed cases if left in, and would significantly skew the dumping margin data. Thus I 
have chosen to omit this year in my analysis. 
                                                        
13 Bruegel (2012), Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: a new database [Data file], retrieved 
from http://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/real-effective-exchange-rates-for-178-countries-a-new-
database/ 
14 The World Bank (2015), GDP growth (annual %) [Data File], retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
15 National Statistics, R.O.C (Taiwan), Principal Figures(2008SNA)-Annual [Data file], retrieved from 
http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=NA8101A1A&ti=Principal%20Figures(2008SN
A)-Annual&path=../PXfileE/NationalIncome/&lang=1&strList=L 
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Methodology/Model 
 Each observation in our dataset is based on a given country in a given year after 
that country implemented its AD laws (up to the first ten years). The models given in 
Table 1 estimate the effect of the variables on the number of cases filed in a given year. 
Since the dependent variable is positive and discrete, we use a negative binomial 
regression. The regressors included in the model are number of years since AD law 
implementation, real GDP, real effective exchange rate, and country fixed effects. We 
include a squared version of the years since implementation variable to capture non-
linear aspects of the relationships. We might expect a significant squared years variable 
in many of the models where the dependent variable increases at a decreasing rate over 
time. Such a relationship could be present in the model for AD filings if firm learning 
allows firms to file weaker cases, leading to lower growth in filings in later years as 
firms have more difficulty finding additional cases. 
 The inclusion of real GDP and real effective exchange rate variables are based 
on a paper by Knetter and Prusa (2003), that identifies real GDP and real exchange rate 
fluctuations as the primary macroeconomic factors that effect antidumping filings.16 
Similarly to Knetter and Prusa’s model, we take the log of both the real effective 
exchange rate and the real GDP. We also include a one year lagged real exchange rate 
variable, and a one, two, and three year lagged real GDP variable. These lagged 
variables were also included in Knetter and Prusa’s model to account for the influence 
of these variables in previous years on the decision to file an AD petition. 
                                                        
16 Knetter and Prusa, “Macroeconomic factors.” 
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 The rest of the models in Tables 2 through 4 are basic multivariate regressions. 
They include the same regressors, but replace the dependent variable with minimum 
and maximum dumping margins, percentage of cases given an affirmative and negative 
final decision, percentage of filings in a given industry, and duration of the case. 
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 Table 1 
      Negative binomial estimation of average filings per year since implementation  (1) (2) VARIABLES number of filings number of filings    years since implementation 0.202*** 8.169***  (0.0564) (3.094) square years  -0.498**   (0.193) log(gdp) -2.224*** -34.90**  (0.703) (17.59) log(gdp) (-1) -0.0510 -0.201  (0.120) (1.002) log(gdp) (-2) -0.147* -1.513  (0.0837) (1.246) log(gdp) (-3) 0.310*** 3.480**  (0.0932) (1.621) log(reer) 2.331*** 30.27*  (0.844) (17.61) log(reer) (-1) -0.523 -7.584  (0.465) (11.83) Constant 50.66*** 784.9*  (16.02) (440.3)    Observations 149 149 R-squared  0.246     Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
     Notes: Country fixed effects were included in the model, but omitted in the table. 
The variable log(gdp) (-x) is the log of the GDP lagged x years, and the log(reer) (-1) is 
the log of the real effective exchange rate lagged 1 year.
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   Table 2 
Multiple linear models estimating percentage of cases given an 
affirmative decision 
  (1) (2) VARIABLES affirmative percentage affirmative percentage    years since implementation 1.372 -3.783  (2.028) (4.062) square years  0.495   (0.369) log(gdp) -14.39 -13.71  (23.64) (22.95) log(gdp) (-1) 4.053 4.237  (5.037) (4.708) log(gdp) (-2) -2.120 -1.952  (3.584) (3.567) log(gdp) (-3) -2.668 -2.860  (2.835) (2.826) log(reer) 37.28 38.78  (37.52) (39.03) log(reer) (-1) 21.48 22.10  (20.94) (20.63) Constant 188.7 166.1  (504.6) (491.4)    Observations 149 149 R-squared 0.477 0.486 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
     Notes: Country fixed effects were included in the model, but omitted in the 
table. 
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                Table 3 
Multiple linear regression models estimating minimum and maximum dumping 
margins 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
            Robust standard errors in parentheses          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Country fixed effects were included in the model, but omitted in the table.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES minimum margin minimum margin maximum margin maximum margin      years since implementation 0.801 -7.065 4.702 4.599  (5.099) (16.80) (7.755) (19.85) square years  0.707  0.00923   (1.301)  (1.789) log(gdp) -9.058 -15.64 -20.18 -20.26  (52.24) (48.17) (72.08) (77.48) log(gdp) (-1) -40.02* -42.91** -39.12* -39.16*  (20.88) (20.39) (20.13) (21.29) log(gdp) (-2) 30.50 30.68 28.54 28.54  (20.61) (20.70) (19.88) (20.07) log(gdp) (-3) -2.847 -3.707 1.779 1.768  (11.44) (11.58) (14.25) (14.16) log(reer) -30.00 -18.68 -51.04 -50.90  (103.1) (100.9) (108.1) (115.2) log(reer) (-1) -33.65 -30.66 -32.25 -32.21  (89.18) (88.99) (94.71) (95.57) Constant 914.3 1,139 1,221 1,224  (1,207) (1,083) (1,613) (1,804)      Observations 71 71 71 71 R-squared 0.341 0.343 0.301 0.301 
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Table 4 
Multiple linear regression models estimating percentage of filings initiated by agricultural and 
chemical industries  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 Notes: Country fixed effects were included in the model, but omitted in the table. 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES agriculture_pct agriculture_pct chemicals_pct chemicals_pct      years since implementation -0.0383 -0.399 -0.614 -1.690  (0.656) (1.343) (1.124) (2.771) square years  0.0346  0.103   (0.138)  (0.236) log(gdp) 6.981 7.028 7.608 7.749  (5.511) (5.567) (13.77) (13.61) log(gdp) (-1) -2.935 -2.922 4.962 5.000  (2.038) (2.032) (3.976) (3.952) log(gdp) (-2) -0.230 -0.219 1.432 1.467  (2.600) (2.624) (3.177) (3.215) log(gdp) (-3) 2.344 2.331 1.344 1.304  (1.703) (1.725) (3.808) (3.843) log(reer) -3.830 -3.725 -6.092 -5.778  (8.490) (8.649) (14.49) (14.38) log(reer) (-1) 3.216 3.259 -8.645 -8.515  (7.632) (7.711) (10.83) (10.81) Constant -162.1 -163.6 -325.8 -330.6  (137.9) (140.1) (310.1) (310.3)      Observations 149 149 149 149 R-squared 0.208 0.208 0.417 0.418 
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 Table 5 
Multiple linear regression models estimating percentage of filings initiated by the 
metal industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Robust standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Country fixed effects were included in the model, but omitted in the table. 
 
  
  (5) (6) VARIABLES  metals_pct metals_pct     years since implementation  4.354** 8.356**   (1.775) (3.587) square years   -0.384    (0.302) log(gdp)  -61.47*** -62.00***   (18.34) (18.64) log(gdp) (-1)  -3.447 -3.590   (3.418) (3.243) log(gdp) (-2)  -4.118 -4.249   (3.485) (3.565) log(gdp) (-3)  0.585 0.734   (3.854) (3.932) log(reer)  33.06 31.89   (28.33) (28.05) log(reer) (-1)  19.85 19.37   (17.43) (17.89) Constant  1,624*** 1,641***   (415.6) (424.3)     Observations  149 149 R-squared  0.398 0.405 
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Table 6 
Multiple linear regression models estimating duration of case  (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES duration duration duration duration      years since implementation 5.040 46.68* -4.631 29.83  (6.537) (24.77) (15.03) (29.42) square years  -4.017  -3.144   (2.571)  (2.615) log(gdp)   67.99 51.03    (138.9) (136.3) log(gdp) (-1)   15.77 18.27    (39.92) (42.05) log(gdp) (-2)   -72.59 -69.44    (55.48) (54.98) log(gdp) (-3)   28.41 28.33    (48.48) (47.92) log(reer)   -159.5 -159.3    (214.5) (214.7) log(reer) (-1)   235.6 224.7    (204.8) (196.5) Constant 349.4*** 275.0*** -952.1 -668.0  (53.42) (61.28) (3,509) (3,409)      Observations 109 109 101 101 R-squared 0.293 0.309 0.334 0.343  Robust standard errors in parentheses           *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Country fixed effects were included in the model, but omitted in the table. 
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Results 
Number of Cases Filed 
 The second model in Table 1 indicates that each year since AD laws were 
implemented is expected to increase the number of AD cases filed by about 8, an effect 
that is significant at the 1% significance level. The negative “years since implemented 
squared” term indicates that the rate at which increase in AD cases filed decreases over 
time. Thus, it appears that there is an initial burst of AD cases filings, which levels off 
as a country approaches the ten-year mark since AD law adoption.  
A one percent increase in real GDP is expected to lead to a decrease of about 35 
AD cases filed, significant at the 5% level. Furthermore a one percent increase in the 
real effective exchange rate is expected to lead to an increase of about 30 AD filings, 
significant at the 10% level. The signs of the coefficients on these variables are 
consistent with Knetter and Prusa’s study, which found that “a one standard deviation 
real appreciation of the filing country currency leads to a 33% increase in AD filings” 
and “a one standard deviation fall in domestic real GDP growth leads to a 23% increase 
in AD filings.”17 This suggests that there are no serious problems with the specification 
of our model. 
 
Final Decision Percentages 
 The models in Table 2 regress the percentage of cases with an affirmative final 
AD decision on the same regressors from the previous model. There are no significant 
variables in this model, which indicates that there must be other factors driving the                                                         
17 Knetter and Prusa, “Macroeconomic factors,” 3. 
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changes in AD decisions. Despite the lack of significance in our model, the graph of 
affirmative and negative decision percentages over years since implementation Figure 
1, and the pie charts giving the percentages of each decision in Figure 2 indicates that 
there is an increase in affirmative decisions as a country develops its AD laws. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Affirmative and Negative Cases vs. Years Since AD Laws 
Implemented   
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Figure 2. Percentage of final decision types over the first and second five year periods 
 Notably there is about a nine percent increase in the percentage of affirmative 
decisions, and about a 12 percent decrease in the number of negative decisions. There is 
also an increase in the number of partially affirmative decisions. Partial decisions 
require a more developed and nuanced understanding of AD laws, and the increase in 
partial decisions may indicate that domestic entities may be favoring filings by domestic 
industries through their interpretation of AD laws. Previous research conducted by 
Blonigen (2006b) finds evidence that the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) had 
evolved in its discretionary practices regarding AD laws in order to favor domestic 
firms. While most new AD users do not have access to the same resources as the 
USDOC, the increase in partial and affirmative decisions and the decrease in negative 
decisions may indicate an evolution of discretionary practices along the same lines. 
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Industry Specific Results 
 One of the most interesting results from our regression analysis is the second 
model in Table 5, in which the dependent variable is the percentage of AD filings 
initiated by the metal industry. Each year since a country adopts AD laws is expected to 
increase the proportion of metal cases by about 8 percent at the .05 significance level. 
This finding is consistent with previous research that indicates the metal industry is the 
source of a large portion of total AD filings.18 The results in Table 4 are not significant, 
indicating little change in the share of filings initiated by the agricultural and chemical 
industries over the first ten years after AD law implementation. 
Duration Results 
 The results in Table 4 regarding duration of the case suggest that there is about a 
46 day increase in the mean duration for each year after a country adopts AD laws. 
Previous research suggests there may be a connection between increased case duration 
and firm learning. In a study of firm learning and the AD process in the United States, 
Blonigen found evidence to suggest that firms with greater experience filing AD 
petitions were able to more effectively argue their cases, leading to an increase in 
affirmative decisions. He also found that dumping margins did not increase because 
firms were filing weaker cases in an attempt to work the system. 
 Our results in Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 2 correspond with Blonigen’s findings. 
We see an increase in the number of cases, and the percentage of affirmative decisions. 
                                                        
18 Blonigen and Prusa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties.” 
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We also do not see a significant change in the dumping margins. Finally, we see an 
increase in partially affirmative decisions. This suggests that the increase in duration of 
cases is related to firm learning and increased firm involvement in the AD process, 
coupled with weaker cases being filed over time. More research is necessary to verify 
this pattern of behavior. 
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Conclusion 
The proliferation of new AD users coupled with an increase in the availability 
and quality of data has warranted a closer look at the evolution of anti-dumping filings 
in countries during the first years after the adoption of such laws. Previous literature on 
AD usage indicates that macroeconomic trends and domestic entities may use AD laws 
as a form of protectionism, regardless of whether dumping has legitimately occurred. 
Certain industries such as steel and chemicals have historically been responsible for a 
large share of AD filings. This paper sought to find whether there is evidence that these 
patterns develop during the early years of AD usage in a new user country. 
We find evidence that many of these trends develop in the first ten years after a 
country adopts AD laws. In particular, each year since AD laws are implemented 
increases the number of AD cases filed by about 8. We also find strong evidence that 
real GDP growth and real effective exchange rate are the most influential determinants 
of the volume of AD filings in a given year. The early years after AD law adoption also 
see a significant increase in the percentage of affirmative and partially affirmative case 
rulings, and a decrease in negative rulings. This may suggest that usage of AD laws 
develops over time to benefit domestic firms. We also see a significant increase in the 
share of AD filings initiated by the metal industry, which is consistent with previous 
literature on the metal industries prevalence in AD filings. Finally, we see an increase in 
the duration of cases by about 46 days per year since AD law adoption. 
 Our study is consistent with previous research on firm learning and domestic 
government discretionary practices in the United States. The increase in number of 
filings and affirmative decisions coupled with low changes in dumping margins and 
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increased case duration indicate the possibility that firms are also adapting to AD laws 
at a global level. Further research is needed to understand more precisely the ways in 
which the usage of AD laws by firms and government agencies in new user countries 
develops over time.   
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Appendix 
Countries in Dataset Country AD Cases Percentage Year Adopted.  Brazil 139 4.63 1987 Bulgaria 1 0.03 1993 Chile 7 0.23 1986 China 262 8.72 1997 Colombia 80 2.66 1991 Costa Rica 8 0.27 1996 Czech Republic 3 0.10 1997 Dominican Republic 1 0.03 2001 Ecuador 2 0.07 1991 Egypt 54 1.80 1998 Guatemala 1 0.03 1996 India 20 0.67 1985 Indonesia 121 4.03 1995 Israel 54 1.80 1991 Jordan 1 0.03 2003 Latvia 7 0.23 2000 Lithuania 7 0.23 1998 Mexico 1,433 47.70 1986 Nicaragua 3 0.10 1995 Panama 2 0.07 1996 Paraguay 2 0.07 1996 Peru 167 5.56 1991 Philippines 47 1.56 1994 Poland 12 0.40 1997 Slovenia 1 0.03 1993 Taiwan 89 2.96 1984 Thailand 232 7.72 1994 Trinidad and Tobago 11 0.37 1992 Turkey 129 4.29 1989 Ukraine 14 0.47 1999 Venezuela 94 3.13 1992 
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